

TV Show
Sunday Night
3/29/64

COMMENTATOR: Good evening. I am Hanson Baldwin, Military Editor of the New York Times, and the moderator of the program tonight: "The Hidden Art of Intelligence". Intelligence is one of the oldest professions in the world, just as old as soldiering and probably just as important. We're told in the Bible that when Moses was in the wilderness with the children of Israel he was directed by the Lord to send men to spy out the land of Canaan. Moses gave them instructions to see the land, what it is, and the people that dwell therein, whether they be strong or weak, few or many. Spies, agents, and intelligence experts have been doing just about that same thing ever since. Tonight for our panel discussion we have a quartet of experts whom I'd like to introduce to you now.

On my right is Allen Dulles, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency for more than eight years. He's a lawyer who has had a long and distinguished career in the American Diplomatic and intelligence services. Mr. Dulles has received three of the highest American decorations granted to civilians -- the Medal of Freedom and the Medal of Merit for his war work, and the National Security Medal for his work with the CIA. He is the author of the "Craft of Intelligence".

On my left is Miss Helen (McGuinness) who has earned an international reputation as the author of suspense novels set against a background of contemporary history. She is the author of Decision at Delphi and the Venetian Affair, her recent and most best selling novel. So accurate is Miss McGuinness' research and insight that verifications of her fictional approach to intelligence operations continually appear in the press.

Opposite me is Peter (Deryarbian), a former officer of the Soviet State Security Forces, the KGB. He has supervised Soviet agents' counterintelligence work in Europe as well as at the KGB's Moscow headquarters, a rather dreaded headquarters I may add. Mr. Deryarbian escaped to the West in 1954 from Vienna, where he was then stationed. His book, "The Secret World", written with the help of Frank (Gibney), is one of the few authoritative accounts of Soviet intelligence apparatus. In the past decade he has attended American universities and is now working as a consultant for various government agencies. At Mr. Deryarbian's request, and for obvious reasons, we are not showing his face on this program.

On my far right is James B. Donovan, a New York attorney, who has served as General Counsel of the OSS, the Office of Strategic Services, the forerunner of the CIA, during World War II. Mr. Donovan was appointed by Federal Court on recommendation of the local bar

association to defend Colonel Rudolf Abel, Chief of Soviet espionage in the United States. His book, *Strangers on a Bridge*, published in March 1964, details the story of the trial and its culmination in the exchange of Abel for U-2 pilot Francis Gary Powers and two other Americans. A Commander in the United States Naval Intelligence, retired, Mr. Donovan has received numerous awards for civic and bar association activities. He is presently President of the Board of Education of New York City.

We will return in a moment.

In addition to the distinguished panel that you've just met we had hoped to have another participant tonight, but he has sent his regrets in a rather curious telegram. The participant was to have been Ian Fleming, the author of the James Bond books, and he said: "Terribly sorry. Flying London direct next week. Am bored with subject." For a man who has made perhaps a million dollars out of espionage novels, it struck me that his boredom was perhaps ill placed.

MR. DULLES: I don't know that they're espionage novels -- that's one of the questions...

I like them. I think they're interesting. I read them. I know him well. But I wouldn't call it espionage. They're thrillers.

MISS M: He was in Naval Intelligence during the last war, wasn't he? -- World War II.

MR. DULLES: I believe he was.

MISS M: (continuing) I think he says that in the back of his books. I mean I'm not giving away any secrets. I think I saw that written about him.

COMMENTATOR: Allen, I would like to read something, with which you are very familiar, in starting the discussion tonight, and then ask you a rather pointed question. The quotation is as follows: "Your successes are unheralded, your failures are trumpeted, but I am sure you realize how important is your work, how essential it is, and in the long sweep of history how significant your efforts will be judged." This was said, as you well remember, by the late President Kennedy when he dedicated the new CIA building in Maryland and said farewell to you. I would like to ask you now about one of your failures which has been trumpeted quite to the skies, and that is the Bay of Pigs. Public criticism of the Bay of Pigs is I think generalized in a capsule. The public feels that the CIA did a bad job. What about it?

MR. DULLES: Well I'm glad to get that question right early. I mean, Hanson you and I have known each other for a good many decades and I'll call you Hanson. That quotation as you say were the words of the President

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GUEST: Definitely.

COMMENTATOR: The two facets of the criticism are first, that the CIA was conducting secret covert operations which amounted really to the use of military force, and at the same time it was collecting intelligence about Cuba, about the enemy that the military forces were going to oppose. A lot of people feel -- and I think I'm a junior member of this group of five -- I think a lot of people feel that the same intelligence organization should not conduct operations simultaneously, that is, collecting intelligence since intelligence is liable to be biased or its operations may not be well directed. In the case of the Bay of Pigs, I think both criticisms were directed to the CIA, that the operations were not well conducted and I'm not belaboring this point or belaboring you Allen. I'm just trying to get it as a handle --

MR. DULLES: Go ahead -- belabor as you want.

COMMENTATOR: I'm just trying to get it as a handle for an understanding of what proper intelligence is and what the techniques of intelligence are and should be.

MR. DULLES: Well, may I say -- are you finished? I don't want to interrupt you.

COMMENTATOR: Sure.

MR. DULLES (continuing): -- that at this very time not only was the CIA collecting intelligence about Cuba, but the State Department was collecting intelligence about Cuba, the Army, Navy, and the Air Force were collecting intelligence about Cuba. And when any estimates were made prior to the Bay of Pigs or during the October - November crisis of '62, that intelligence was not CIA intelligence, it was the consolidated intelligence of all intelligence gathering agencies of government ---

COMMENTATOR: You think it was good intelligence I find.

MR. DULLES: Oh yes, oh yes.

COMMENTATOR: I know, but I mean that was one of the criticisms. The estimates were good you think?

MR. DULLES: I think the estimates were all right. As far as I recall the estimates could only be... possibly. With regard to those two or three jet trainers, we knew they had the jet trainers but those particular jet trainers had somewhat more (armament) than we knew but otherwise --

COMMENTATOR: They were no longer trainers

MR. DULLES: They were no longer trainers. We knew they had been armed but they were armed a little more heavily than we had known. So the -- I think the intelligence about the forces that Castro had at his disposal at the time of the Bay of Pigs was sound intelligence.

COMMENTATOR: What about the operations? Perhaps you have some thought on these, Miss McGuinness.

MISS M: No, this has puzzled me a great deal. As you know, when I get my knowledge of intelligence from reading newspapers, which always horrifies any of my friends who work in newspapers -- they can't believe that they print enough things which if gathered over and desilvered and analyzed could even -- I think very helpful to the enemy. And that is how I've worked. But the Bay of Pigs is something that I could only -- well it was such a shock. In a way you were almost afraid to think about it. It seemed to me however that there seemed to be cross purposes somewhere in either the gathering or -- the gathering possibly, but the evaluation of the information gathered perhaps that might have been one weakness, but I wouldn't know. That was the feeling I got from what I read -- that I read.

COMMENTATOR: Maybe if it wasn't the ruthless will behind it, would the Soviets have hesitated, at the last -- I mean Mr. Deryarbian would they have hesitated at the last -- I mean would -- when these people were ashore or coming ashore and were getting beaten, wouldn't the Russians have probably supported them to the full if they had been in the opposite --

MR. DERYARBIAN: Oh, I believe suppose they would.

COMMENTATOR: They did in Hungary, didn't they?

MISS M: Yes.

MR. DERYARBIAN: Because if American operations fall they were so happen to hurt it. What they can do else. They put their forces there, they help the Cubans and everything, and they will do everything what is possible for them.

COMMENTATOR: What really we are getting at here seems to me in a broader sense is what is intelligence? I read the definition - the biblical definition of it which I think is as good as any in a sense, but of course intelligence is now taking advantage of all the arts, all the sciences - isn't it?

DULLES: Yes.

COMMENTATOR: (continued) and it is an art and a science. What is intelligence? It is proper to call intelligence black radio agents, double agents, appraisals? Have you a definition?

PETER: Yes. Do you want me or Mr. Donovan?

COMMENTATOR: Go ahead Mr. Donovan.

DONOVAN: These are related I would say to intelligence, but in its purest sense. I would say that the strategic intelligence, which is what we are primarily concerned with is the ascertainment to the greatest possible degree of the total capabilities of every other nation and their intentions toward us.

COMMENTATOR: Yes, but now how do we do this, and what are the techniques and what are the personnel involved in doing this. You

are all experts in this field - how is this done? Can you give me some idea - give the audience some idea to the breadth of an intelligence gathering organization? What sources does it tap? What people does it use and how do they select them and so on? Any ideas?

DULLES: Shall I start out on that?

COMMENTATOR: Sure.

DULLES: I would narrow the definition that Jim gave just a little bit, because in intelligence you have to pick and choose. I would say that it is all the information that the policy makers require in order to direct a proper policy with respect to those countries that threaten our security. That is today we have to choose, Soviet Union is the main target, Communist China, - the Communist Bloc is the target. We can't go around and bother with every country in the world. You haven't got the assets or you have to start out and go on a sort of narrow field, and then you use all the means that you have to get that intelligence from that particular group of countries.

COMMENTATOR: Ipso facto, if this means doesn't it - correct me if I'm wrong, but if it really means that if we do have to collect intelligence on most of the countries in the world because we have operations in most of the world - military or political or economical or one sort of another.

DULLES: Yea, a great deal of that intelligence can be gained by the normal means of diplomacy

HELEN: Yea, that's always been standard

DULLES: (continuing) in regard to England and France and those other countries. Now most of that can be collected by the ordinary overt means including the military as you know so well who assesses the military potential of a country.

COMMENTATOR: How much of intelligence - how much of the basic grit of intelligence is collected by open means? Not secret, but open.

DULLES: A very large percentage. I don't know - some people put it as high as 80 per cent, but it is often the 20, 30, or 40 percent that is the very essential part. Take the Soviet position in missiles, you can't get that by overt means, you have to get that by covert means up to a large percentage.

HELEN: Isn't it true that Mr. Dulles, that the Soviets have always worked perhaps they are our closest. . . this has been the tendency in their own nature and their own development that they have worked a great deal always by taking and we ought to define this - covert espionage - that is filching things from offices, getting inside - your agent's inside, getting the documents and the papers that are official and are top secret.

DULLES: That is what they want. No question about that. Maybe Deryanlian can add to that.

HELEN: They do that much more than the overt way which we do which is all in the surface and if anyone would just apply their brains they could pick things up here and there. But it seemed to me to that perhaps isn't it true that they do this and we also hear of them having files and piles of publications - buying up publications and all the attaches, not through the Soviet Embassy and Consulates, but all the countries behind the Iron Curtain, the Polish Embassies, so on - all of them are always getting every bit of new material that is published by aviation or engineering or anything else. But that is not the first source that they use seemingly, they think the greatest truth lies in what we keep secret locked in a file and that. . . . Please tell me whether there is any truth in this? I had heard that they use the open overt intelligence work just to verify or at least they did this to verify the facts which they found out from the covert work which is agents installed in secret undercover work. Right?

PETER: That's right. Well they have to - I was going to make one point about the definition of intelligence, how the Soviets, Communist Party, the Soviet Communist official and Soviet Intelligence Officer understands what is intelligence. First of all, in Soviet it is not only gotten information to get any kind of information - it's the part of intelligence - also part of

Soviet intelligence, but when they are talking about intelligence first of all they have in mind the penetration of the enemy forces by any kind of means to get the information or any kind of other thing. Now they also have subversion. They also have in mind to spread the given information among the enemies and among other services outside the Soviet Union. Also spread the propaganda because this information in propaganda in the Soviet Union is a part of their intelligence work, and the main purpose for Soviet intelligence is to promote the Communism around the world. This for awhile - the Soviet intelligence is, first of all, Soviet intelligence have serving - served is not an officer who got the information.

COMMENTATOR: I didn't catch that.

PETER: Who has got the only information. First of all he calls himself as employee - of not the intelligence as employee of the central committee of the Communist Party. From here we have to start, and they use any kind of means to promote Communism, including terror even in now-a-days.

COMMENTATOR: Yes. But when they are operating externally, I think, to come back to Miss McGuinness' point - does the Soviet agent actually do all this pilfering of secret files that we were talking about a

moment ago, and if so how is that intelligence -- the intelligence he collects -- evaluated, compared with the other sources that they receive in Moscow?

PETER: Well, we have to start from the legal and the illegal apparatus of the Soviet intelligence. I believe you know that the legal Soviet representative, ambassador, consular or correspondent who officially came to this country or any kind of country outside the Soviet Union with a passport. . . .

COMMENTATOR: Legally

PETER: Legally. There is another apparatus which is illegal apparatus or in Soviet Union they call them (illegal) who is most of the time a Soviet citizen, he is trained inside the Soviet Union, then he got another identification and go to the second country, and the second country he accustomed to live there, then he got third identification in both of his final station, where he supposed to be, he is a citizen of that country, native of that country, he is working, maybe in the government, governmental office or any kind of company and he has the access to all information that the Soviet intelligence needs. One representative of that was Able, known to Mr. Donovan in Poland, from this panel.

COMMENTATOR: Thank you Mr. Deryarbian. We will pause here for a moment and will return shortly.

COMMENTATOR: Mr. Deryarblian that definition of yours of the duties of a Soviet Intelligent agent and your reference to Colonel Abel, prompt me to ask Mr. Donovan a little bit about Colonel Abel's character and also to ask you if you could tell us anything about what you know of the way in which he was trained and prepared for this mission in the United States?

DONOVAN: Well as Mr. Deryarblian said, they distinguish between the legal and the illegal apparatus. Abel was a resident agent with North America, an illegal part of the apparatus, but in answer to a question that Miss McGuinness raised earlier - since I explained before and as Allen Dulles has amplified the object of intelligence is to ascertain the capabilities, the intentions of other nations in sufficient form to enable our policy makers to make informed decisions on the problems that confront them. This is sort in every way, but even though the most valuable intelligence at times might be secured by covert means, I think as Mr. Dulles indicated, the great bulk of intelligence - perhaps up to 80 percent as indicated would remain overt. Now far more rather clearly would flow out of this country or any democracy in overt form available to the Soviet, or police state and they could quite heavily rely on everything from Congressional hearings, stockholder's reports boasting of their newest

developments in military aircraft, their contribution to the Armed Forces - this however is not true coming their way. Of course it is surprising enough of information can be cleaned from overt sources both with respect to Russia and I would assume Red China, but nevertheless it is increasingly difficult for a democracy to obtain that kind of information except by covert means.

COMMENTATOR: What sort of information precisely did Colonel Abel collect?

DONOVAN: Well Abel was linked in with, by the evidence of the trial, with atomic energy.

COMMENTATOR: Secret documents - that sort of thing?

DONOVAN: Well, he - to be specific about it - he had been entrusted with funds that were to be used to get some of those who have been involved in the Rosenberg Case.

COMMENTATOR: I see.

DONOVAN: And, there was testimony on this. He also was entrusted because of his rather remarkable scientific background and the library seized... would have indicated his range of knowledge in physics, mathematics and nuclear energy, and that he was engaged in anything of a highly scientific nature.

COMMENTATOR: It was your impression, I gather, that Colonel Abel did this of his own free will - not through terror?

DONOVAN: Oh, I would say

DULLES: Not through what?

COMMENTATOR: Terror

DONOVAN: Oh, I would say very definitely not through terror.

HELEN: He was a career officer wasn't he?

COMMENTATOR: Yes, well, this is what interests me. I wonder if Miss McGuinness would have some ideas about the kind of man who would willingly become an agent of this sort.

MISS M: Well, I--

COMMENTATOR: What are his characteristics? What are his qualifications?

MISS M: At that moment I was thinking from the Rosenbergs. I jumped right back to the initial breaking of that case which had been the classical old case, which is a great classic, of Igor Gouzenko, page 26 ... up in Ottawa who was the first to come over that we, the public, because I am a member of the public, you are the professionals, I'm a member of the public and he was the first to come over and I think you know that perhaps because of talking with my friends so much about this thing all of them who are ~~just~~ just members of the public like me - sometimes they wonder

about the necessity of the need of having an intelligence service, and a lot of the criticism that comes against the CIA really comes from this feeling that well, we here in America don't really like the idea of all this spying and suspicion, etc. etc. Well -

COMMENTATOR: I think you are quite right you know.

MISS M: If I just could

DULLES: I think you are quite right, but I would like to answer that - I would like to answer that when you get through.

MISS M: Yes. You know the Gozenko case was so interesting to me, probably not for the reasons it interested you - the professionals, but then when - what did he do when he decided with his wife and his young baby, he decided the 5th of September 1945, took the papers out of the safe where he was working for the Soviet Embassy in Ottawa, he knew they contained deadly stuff, and he thought that he would show this to the Canadians, that this was - show that he really wants to stay in Canada, and he also wanted to prove something which none of us believed at that time, at least no one I knew believed it, that the Soviets were waging a war against us, although they were still our allies.

DULLES: And that the nuclear secret - were their major target.

LAUGHTER

COMMENTATOR: I don't think that man was a very good reporter. He couldn't get a job on the New York Times. LAUGHTER

DULLES: I know the Mounties well.

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DULLES: Then I understand a great intelligence officer intervened.

MISS M: Yes. At that - now just - shall I name? His name was William Stevenson, a Canadian, and he was head here of a British Intelligence Unit called the British Security Coordination, which title is given by the FBI, they worked along with the FBI, they worked along allegedly with the OSS, Mr. Donovan. They were tracking down Nazi propagandists, Nazi people who were infiltrating business firms and trying to get Nazi supplies, our supplies under false names over to Germany. Well anyway, he happened to be... such a good intelligence chief because he never explained how he happened to be in Ottawa on that date, but that evening he just happened to be, the story goes, of September 6th when poor Gozenko had been wandering all day, and had been shuffled around and told to go home, and he had heard the rumor and that night he went to someone, equivalent to the State Department up there, and said: look any truth in this, they said "yes", so he immediately realized two things that no one else had realized in that time, because the climate of opinion was not favorable to the realizing of it even among honest, honorable, intelligent clever men. And this was simply that first of all Gozenko's wife and child were in danger of ~~death~~ death. Secondly,

DULLES: That is why we need to have to get back, need to have intelligence officers

MISS M: Yes, this is my point, my whole point, because and secondly no man would have taken any papers out of so-so - unless they were intensely interesting and valuable papers - that this was a desperate move by a young man who was desperate.

COMMENTATOR: Let me interject here and ask three questions immediately, because I think these are very hot. I would like to ask Allen first if he sent Mr. Stevenson to Ottawa or had something to do with sending him, or the same question to you - you were in OSS.

DULLES: I was in Berlin at the time, so I didn't know --

COMMENTATOR: You didn't know about it?

COMMENTATOR: The third question I'd like to get to Mr. Deryarbian and find out what he can tell us from the Soviet side of the Gozenko case, but I'd like to hear your answer.

DONOVAN: Well, I think that one thing ought to be made clear in fairness to U. S. intelligence services during the war. Any idea that our intelligence services because Soviet Russia was an ally --

MISS M: No talking about intelligence now - I didn't say that. I wasn't talking about intelligence services, I was talking about a newspaper. I was talking about an ordinary policeman, I was talking about politicians

and diplomats, and I was just saying that also he didn't solve the whole thing - all he did was to go along at four in the morning - see that four Russians had broken into the apartment and ransacked it, realized it was big stuff, got immediately on within hours to the Prime Minister, next morning early the Gozenkos were taken into safety and they started analyzing and listening to him and looking at the documents.

DULLES: I realize this and

MISS M: And immediately the FBI was in -- then immediately the British Intelligence was in and the high intelligence sect of the Mounted Police.

DONOVAN: But as Mr. Dulles began to say before this is an excellent demonstration of why you need to train intelligence people because they can realize the significance of some of these things, which perhaps to the ordinary person would have little or no significance. Now with all respect to Mr. Stevenson and his brilliant work, I think it is fair to say that any of our top intelligence people would have reached the same conclusion.

(All answer yes)

COMMENTATOR: Now let me get Mr. Deryarbian's view now from the Soviet point of view. What did you know - you were at that time when Gozenko did this? You were at that time in the KGB, were you not?

DERYARBIAN: Yes, at that time I was in the KGB

COMMENTATOR: What did you know about the Gozenko case?

DERYARBIAN: First of all to say about the Gozenko case, of course, it was full shake-up in the Soviet intelligence service.

COMMENTATOR: I didn't catch that.

DERYARBIAN: Full shake-up, when Gozenko left.

COMMENTATOR: That was just after the Beria business, wasn't it?

DERYARBIAN: It was - no no no - it was after World War II.

DULLES: It was just at the end of World War I.

MISS M: World War II

DERYARBIAN: Soviet operations were stopped for a while because of the disappearance of Gozenko and, of course, everybody in Soviet intelligence services were avoiding what happened, and all were shook up around the full system of KGB or formerly known as in that time the NKVD or the JRU. But what I'm going to say here about the Gozenko case, when you are talking about it, you have to have a smart intelligence people ~~xxxx~~ who need the Soviets when they came to you as a volunteer or as fighter for freedom. For say example, one example in my case when they come to American Legation, it was military legation in Vienna and told them I am working as an assistant to the deputies high commissioner in Vienna and I like to have political assylum. And

the men told to me "do you know what you are doing?" and I just was stunned and did not know what to do. One thing because I was an intelligence officer I ask him alright, then find anybody who is here from CIA or CIC whom I can contact and talk it over. And finally I was waiting for twenty minutes somebody came over and I explained even that man asked me three times this question. "Do you know what you are doing". "Do you think about that", and some other questions. What I mean using these examples, is to say that the Soviet Union is -- the state security in the KGB in their new office in Moscow -- any foreigner will go to visit any Soviet office. The Man who talk to this foreigner say American, British or French will be a state security officer who knows what kind of answer to give, and what kind of direction to give or just take your name and make investigation and talk to you later or give you straight answer, and so on.

DONOVAN: There are two factors that should be ~~mentioned~~ considered in this. One is with respect to what Miss M was talking about and also the kind of attitude that you described and this simply is true that throughout the 1930's and then because our sympathies were against Nazi Germany, that a tremendous number of people were downright naive concerning the full intentions of the Soviet ~~UNION~~ Union with respect to their post-war intentions.

COMMENTATOR: And yet it was all down on paper. Wasn't it?

DONOVAN: Well so was Mein Kampf but people didn't believe it and the United States, a lot of bleeding hearts kept regarding the Soviet Union as our brothers throughout the war. Now this is just a fact. I'm just saying this was not true in our intelligence services and now to the maximum extent even where we had to use suspicious people we tried to make it a one way street. The other thing I was going to say was that what you do have to appreciate Mr. Deryarblian is the utter difference in background between our development in the United States in a free society and in Soviet Russia. It isn't too long ago when a secretary of state said that gentlemen don't open other people's mail and...

DULLES: And he was very glad later that they did...

DONOVAN: Yes, he was but that kind of an old school tie appraisal is so unrealistic when you're dealing with an enemy such as we've been facing.

DERYARBILIAN: Well I completely agree with you when you say, but when I said that in the Soviet Union, in Moscow, you see all the time only state security officer because to talk to such people who will go to contact the Soviets - but what you said you see it was my first lesson about the free society when American told to me "do you know what you are doing" and everything was in the newspaper later on and so on and so on. It was good lesson, I never forget it and I appreciate it very much.

COMMENTATOR: Let me quickly ask a leading question, to each one of you if you can give a very brief answer. Who makes the best spy - an American or a Russian? Can you distinguish by nationalities?

DULLES: No, you can't distinguish by nationalities.

DERYARBIAN: I would say no too. Because any nationality, either American or Russian, can be good spy and can be bad spy. It depends on the personality of the person who is involved in this business.

DULLES: And the training

DERYARBIAN: And the training, of course.

DONOVAN: It also once again is true that the basic differences between the two societies makes it so much easier for a man such as Abel or any other similar person to be assimilated into our society. Five hundred could be lost in Brooklyn tomorrow and you'd have very great difficulties in tracking them down because we have so cosmopolitan and so heterogeneous a society and we have no police controls, we don't have identity cards, and it's far more difficult together with our language difficulties, our national deficiency in foreign languages. . . .

DULLES: It's far easier to spy on the United States than it is for the U. S. to - or any other free country - to spy on the Soviet Union. That's why you have to use other methods.

SHORT BREAK

COMMENTATOR: We were discussing what made a good spy. I still feel its possible to characterize a good agent. Do you have any ideas Miss McGuinness?

MISS M: Well, I should imagine that agents would be divided into the kind of work that they are doing. Isn't that fairly obvious? The character of one type would be necessary for certain jobs and a certain other type of agent for other jobs. We do know some of the results that have been published twenty years after. You know I always think the ("Doomar Book") "Twenty Years After" is awfully appropriate to spy stories because it always seems twenty years after that anything gets rarely published about them. We do have things coming from the type of men who did the best work by results when they were dropped into occupied France in 1943 and 44 and there the people choosing them found that they didn't always go along with the psychiatrist after all. They often chose them from their own feeling of character of the person when they were talking to them and watching them, and being with them. Listening to them. And the success of such operations in occupied France, working with the underground, depended almost always on the character of the agents sent in and the character had to be _____ and he wasn't a flamboyant type, he wasn't particularly noticeable, he was intelligent naturally and could speak the language well, but he also had to have a

great deal of quiet courage and he was neither, he wasn't a deadbeat and he wasn't a man who thought he was interesting, and he wasn't a man who was posing as anything. In fact it ends a lot of ideas that the general ~~public~~ public has about an agent when you hear them talking about secret service agents you often think they are straight out of a grade D movie. But this quality that most of all they said was that they must be inspired with confidence, and I'm quoting from a man who selected these agents, he said, "a passionate belief", and they did the best work. Men whose motives had been for money, or for fame, or for personal vengeance were no good at all, and were usually avoided if they could possibly find out in time. You wanted men in fact who felt that this was their way of being able to make a real contribution to the cause of their country.

DULLES: Sounds like Nathan Hale, but not all spies are like Nathan Hale.

MISS M: Well, this is the best, the most successful, the ones who did the best jobs, the most dangerous jobs, and had less people killed around them. Well that's success isn't it?

COMMENTATOR: Well, what about it?

DULLES: Well I go along with that to a certain point. But basically, in espionage, the best spy is the fellow that has the best sources. And that's far more important than all the virtues in the world.

COMMENTATOR: That sounds like a newspaper man.

DULLES: Well, that's quite true

COMMENTATOR: I didn't know we were in the same category.

DULLES: Well, of course, you're in the same category.

DONOVAN: Occasionally the best spy is one with this passionate devotion, but also passionate devotion to money, if he has the best sources.

DULLES: There are people who have been good spies for money. During World War II when I ran quite a number of spies, the two top spies I had, and for a very good reason --

COMMENTATOR: This was when you were in Switzerland?

DULLES: This was when I was in Switzerland in World War II operating against the Nazis. And that was the easiest target to operate against because we had a lot of these devoted people, devoted anti-nazis and my two top agents at that time, and they were good - why - one was in the German intelligence service as a lieutenant of Admiral (Canaris) the head of the obviary Germany, and obviously he was good because he had the sources. The other ~~ex~~ was in the German Foreign Office and he had access to all the secret telegrams and sent them out to me. Now those are the kind of ~~xxx~~ spies to have.

MISS M: You're being too modest there. I was going to ask you and this may even tie in with it. What was one of the greatest feats that you know in espionage, and I think among greatest feats and then I want to ask you the same question - because frankly don't you think if we can get a man like that isn't that something you have accomplished, if you can find such a man.

DULLES: Yes, it comes by accident sometimes though

MISS M: Does it

DULLES: You have got to seize the opportunity

COMMENTATOR: I think this question of greatest devotion is devotion to what because one of the problems in World War II is that many of the underground movements in various countries in France and in Vietnam were hinged around the Communists, (PoCheMen) was a Communist

Oh yes.

The OSS helped to make PoCheMen a - didn't they Mr. Donovan.

DULLES: One of our dangers today Hanson is that we don't realize that there are a lot of people who are devoted communists and who will give their lives for it and that is why the movement is so dangerous.

COMMENTATOR: That is right, it also brings up the question of whether or not the Communists or other agents have penetrated our present intelligence organization. Is the CIA penetrated?

DULLES: We have no evidence of it as far as I know. I haven't been attached to it for over two years.

COMMENTATOR: But would you expect it to be, wouldn't you?

DULLES: I would expect that they would make very good efforts to penetrate it. We know of a good many efforts to penetrate it.

COMMENTATOR: What about the recent reports in a local paper about so many identified agents in the CIA and within the State Department.

DULLES: Well, they have never been identified. That is all hot air.

COMMENTATOR: You think so? Mr. Deryarbian?

DERYARBIAN: Well, I agree with Mr. Dulles. The Soviets do make every effort to penetrate the State Department, CIA, any kind of American operations. I don't know if they really succeeded or not, but I read the newspapers and they didn't say anything definite about that.

COMMENTATOR: But in your day had they succeeded in penetrating the CIA.

DERYARBIAN: No, in my day I don't know of any example where they penetrated the CIA, but some American low level offices in Germany, military establishments, little ones, you know, like on the soldier level, it was, yes. And also it was some recruitment in American Embassies in Soviet Union, like you know example the case of Rhodes. I heard that Rhodes, not by name in anything, but I heard from the Chief of American Section counterintelligence there, that he has this man, I didn't know who is he because you know in intelligence you never ask about this.

COMMENTATOR: How did they get these men? Were they entrapped by sex or by what?

DERYARJIAN: Well, because I was not involved in that case and so in how they trapped him, it was... I don't know particularly how they got him.

COMMENTATOR: The combination of sex and money. To pursue one point a little you see Miss M what you were talking about was the psychological assessment during the whole program to select agents who then would go in to perform specific functions. My point was that occasionally you would find someone who has the access to the best sources but who is for one reason or ~~that~~ the other is - blackmail or otherwise - is desperately in need of funds, and such a person is not one you would go out to recruit as your friend would have during the war to be sent on various expeditions. But at a specific time, if he has the access to the documents and you find out that he is desperately in need of funds, at times there is no question but what funds have played a part. Now in the case of Rhodes what was done was that first they found his weakness which was alcohol which seems to be rather common among a lot of people engaged in this trade, in fact the ~~un~~ combination of martinis and women, there seems to be something about that amalgam that makes the downfall of many.

DULLIES: Not only of spies

COMMENTATOR: No, it happens on Madison Avenue too. But my only point is that in Rhodes case through taking advantage of that weakness, they involved him with a Russian girl and then subsequently through threats of exposing him, began to pay him. They have a tradition you know of taking a receipt for the first amounts they pay in order to keep them on, and he subsequently found his work on the black market so lucrative over there in roubles that he eventually wound up doing it more I would say for money than any other reason.

DULLES: You know sometimes they force money on you. You know take the case of Klaus Fuchs and some of these atomic spies, they forced them to take money so they could get the receipt, and then they were always in a position to disclose you see.

COMMENTATOR: Well what we have really been saying is that the motivation for espionage is about as broad as the human heart. That it could be money, it could be ~~sex~~ sex, it could be weakness of various sorts, it could be revenge, it could be a passionate love for your country, it could be a passionate love for an ideology, almost anything.

DULLES: A passionate hate too.

DONOVAN: That's right, as in the case of the ~~Nazi~~ Nazi/

COMMENTATOR: So we are really dealing and this is why I would tend to agree with you Allen, it seems to me almost impossible to define the ideal spy because you are really dealing with human beings, you are dealing with people who have different motivations and different

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MRS M: And different jobs ahead of them too. A man dropped into work with people in guerrilla warfare is going to have quite a different approach to the situation from a man who is infiltrating a diplomatic circle somewhere else. So you see its absolutely different men for the jobs, with probably I don't know but I ~~was~~ would guess probably as many different phases as universities have different faculties to round out the whole thing.

DULLES: Now take the series of spies that we've had. Take the Colonel in Sweden, money seems to have been the motive there. In many cases its because you're not succeeding well in your profession, you're not getting ahead as fast as you think you should and therefore you're susceptible to do things like this.

MRS M: Or they may just be very clever. I sometimes think the Soviets are extremely clever and will find out the vanity of a man or of a woman and rely upon that to realize he likes certain things he can't quite get with the job he's got in how own government.

DULLES: That's quite good and true.

MRS M: ...then will gradually even make a long campaign about it, in order to gradually entice him into a standard of living which he can't leave and then blackmail him on top of it.

COMMENTATOR: Well as I read your story, Col. Deryarblian, it seems to have been in a sense your motivation for going with the KGB in the

first place, was the material regard, because you lived so miserably in Russia - that you had an opportunity to get better pay, much better living conditions in the KGB than you could in any civilian job, wasn't this true.

DERYARBIAN: It is true that is one of the motivations. Second, because I was a member of the Communist Party I was ordered to go in the spy business, and in Soviet Union, as I pointed out before, the intelligence apparatus belongs to the Central Committee of the Communist Party. We are (I'm talking in the past) the workers of the Central EK Committee. We belong to the one shop

COMMENTATOR: They make it very attractive for you don't they?

DERYARBIAN: Of course

COMMENTATOR: In the KGB and its predecessor organizations, they give you the training, the pay, the status, the continuity, until there's a change in the time...

DERYARBIAN: Freedom, and other things - of course its a certain attraction. You are more ~~independent~~ independent there, you are almost higher than a regular member of the Communist Party and of course you go.

COMMENTATOR: Now we've been concentrating so far largely on the agent, the personality, the individual, but I would like to suggest an increasingly important source of intelligence today is modern technology.

The U-2 aircraft, the high flying U-2, the new A-11 which is just been made public, the various types of aircraft that have flown along or over the Iron Curtain. I looked up the statistics the other day and since 1950 almost 100 United States flyers have lost their lives in shooting incidents along or over the Iron Curtain. They collect, obviously, information of great importance; so do photographic reconnaissance satellites, so do electronic devices of various sorts, communications intelligence so called; and this really to my mind is perhaps really the single most important source of our modern intelligence. I would think that the U-2 and its follow up, the A-11, were the greatest single intelligence feat that I know of. I should turn to Allen and ask him about it because he and Mr. Bissel who has since left the CIA, were the principal architects of the U-2. What do you think are the most important single intelligence achievements of our lifetime?

DULLES, Well I think that you're right about the U-2 and why was that developed? You may recall that President Eisenhower at the Geneva Conference back in 1955 I believe it was, proposed an open skies and that was turned down by the Soviet Union. Then it was absolutely essential to get some information with regard to their development of the missile. We didn't know much about it, we knew very little about it, and when the open sky proposal was turned down by the Soviets, it was then that the U-2

was carried on the - to development - and sent aloft. And then we learned the nature and the extent of the Soviet missile development. Then it had a great deal to do with the redoubled effort that was put in, in the middle 50's and the late 50's, and that means that today as a result of that, today I think we have the very best missile force in the world and it is very largely due to what we learned at that time as to what our competition was, the competition from the Soviet Union.

COMMENTATOR: Incidentally, to follow up on what Mr. Dulles is saying, I have always felt that if Powers had had an honest defense counsel at his trial in Moscow that actually there was a perfectly tenable defense that he had which is that in the sky, surely just as at sea, there are only certain limits within which a nation controls its territorial borders and unless it has been agreed upon internationally, and there was never any agreement with respect to the sky, certainly you must reach a place as a matter of how where there is freedom on the skies. And it had been demonstrated for several years that the Soviet Union was not exercising effective control over that area and a perfectly legitimate argument could have been made that Powers and we had every right in the world to the use of the skies.

DULLES: I think that might have made a good legal argument. I don't think it would helped Mr. Powers very much.

COMMENTATOR: It would have been all right in New York State, I'm not saying it would have helped in Moscow, but it would...

MRS M: Here I go speaking of the general public again. Mr. Baldwin isn't it true that there have been innumerable flights by the soviet air force over our borders in Europe. That they do this as a matter of testing out our responses to see if our defenses there are on the alert, how quickly we get up, how quickly do we notice them, and they come over and then they dash right back. Now they never get shot down, do they?

COMMENTATOR: Well, now let me say this. I can't answer specifically as to the innumerable flights over our borders. I believe there have been some very shallow penetrations, over Germany in particular. I doubt if there have been any as far west as England. In our own country there is a regular route for a Russian electronic snooper along the coast of Alaska. I have been up there many times and this snooper has been intercepted by our own aircraft quite a few times. He flies about a hundred miles off the coast over the arctic sea and has a tape recorder and picks up our radar impulses and frequency. In the old days when we had a very limited short leg interceptor which had barely enough speed and altitude and ~~range~~ barely enough range to reach out far enough, we had a hard time intercepting these people. But we have intercepted them twice, and much to the delights of the pilots, we haven't shot them down at all.

DULLES: Well, you can't shoot them down over international waters.

COMMENTATOR: Well we've had some overflights over Alaska too. Not deep ones but we've had some. But I don't think we would take the same methods that the Soviets do. I don't think we would shoot them first.

MISS M: That makes it very funny. You know how we are criticized and we are told beware of our airforce and SAC because some trigger happy man could start the great holocaust, but frankly, no one has done anything or said anything yet about a trigger happy Russian. Seems to me they are shooting down much more quickly and sometimes perhaps even on their own without any orders.

COMMENTATOR: I would like to get back to this and ask Mr. Deryarlian what he thinks is the single finest feat of intelligence that he knows about. Just look at this as a technician now, not as an American or as a Russian. What ~~is~~ you think is the single finest feat of intelligence.

DERYARLIAN: ~~WELL~~ Well, in my opinion, Soviets testing all the time, say the United States and Western countries or members of the NATO, what they will do when their planes go in there. When they did it one time their plane was shot down, nothing came out. They fly again, and again nothing happened. In my opinion, the American or especially the Western Allies should be firm with the Soviet Union. If for instance they stop an American truck on the road, and keep it for three, four days for checking, for no reason. . .

COMMENTATOR: On the Berlin audition you mean/

DENYARBIAN: On the Berlin audubon, it is my opinion to be to send another one hundred trucks right away ~~behind~~ behind this truck because we have the right to send them and then see what the Soviets will do. I don't think they will start war right away, but let them show that we are strong enough to fight back. . . . in the same way, but Americans and Russians wander - they have the same way, the same argument on that and the same rights like they do. I don't understand why this kind of policy is going on. It should be something done and give the answer to the public. Why the Russians kill the Americans and why the Americans didn't do anything. I do not mean to kill the Russians, but it should be something done.

COMMENTATOR: I quite agree with that and I think most of us around this table would although its a little beyond the head of ~~intellect~~ intelligence. We must pause here for a moment and will return shortly.

COMMENTATOR: We were talking before about the United States and its failure to be tough enough/ with the Russians. I stated the fact that about a ~~hundred~~ hundred American flyers had lost their lives in incidents along the Soviet frontier and I don't believe we can point to a single instance in which the Russians have suffered a loss of a life. Mr. Donovan do you have something to say about that?

DONOVAN: Well, I feel this is symptomatic of an attitude that really began to my knowledge, in the middle of World War II, and I think that's

not just speaking a matter of government policy, but I think it has been a whole national approach, that at a time when we were the strongest nation in the world I think our every action and our every reaction in international affairs should always have been dictated from a policy of strength and not a policy of weakness. And I think that in retrospect certainly its rather undeniable that there have been very many incidents in rather crucible times where if we had had a very firm policy of strength we actually would have had more respect from the Russians and in my opinion not a shot would have been fired. I think they are the greatest poker players in the world.

DULLES: I fully agree.

COMMENTATOR: I would like to ask Mr. Deryarhian to give us from his expert knowledge some indication of what changes have taken place in Soviet intelligence during the Khrushchev period and also what role the KGB plays in the Soviet hierarchy and in the Soviet society.

DERYAREHIAN: To start with, I would like to say the organization of each primarily responsible for internal security within the Soviet Union and for espionage and subversion abroad is the Soviet Secret Police, now known as the KGB. Inside the Soviet Union, the Soviet intelligence apparatus is a vast mechanism for the separation and control of the Soviet people. In addition to the KGB, the other element in this apparatus or apparatus of the Soviet communist party, there is a party state control committee and

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Deputy to Khrushchev, then we have the ministries of the public order, then we have the courts and public prosecutors. Abroad espionage and ~~subversion~~ subversion are carried out not only by the KGB but also by a military organization under the Ministry of Defense, called the JRU. Soviet espionage and subversion activity has not declined since Khrushchev took power, but it has increased. The Soviet intelligence organization are more active, more aggressive, more diversified, better organized, and in general more efficient than they ever were. Soviet espionage and subversion today is the greatest single threat to the security of the free world, it is my opinion. I can give you one example: Stalin, speaking generally, did not get personally involved in espionage operations. I mean now talking single operations. He was very ~~interested~~ interested in full espionage, but not in the single operation going here and there. But he left them to supervise one time (Molotov), one time Beria, one time (Malenkov) was responsible. Khrushchev on the other hand takes a personal interest in espionage operations, and even participates personally in their planning and supervision. At least twice in ~~the~~ recent years Khrushchev has called a general meeting of senior Soviet intelligence officers in which he criticized their accomplishments.

COMMENTATOR: When was this, just recently.

DERYABIAN: Just recently, about two years ago, in first 1961. That they are supposed improve their activities. The one good example of that is

one time, let's take example it was in India where in 1959 a whole net of Soviet legals were arrested. I mean agent who depends on the legal...

COMMENTATOR: Legally in the country, right?

DERYARBIAN: That's right. Nehru protested personally to the Soviet Union officials against espionage activities. Then was the meeting called the President of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of which Khrushchev is the boss and minister of foreign affairs, Gromyko, told to the meeting and said or suggested stopping all intelligence operation in India for a while because it caused bad relations between India and the Soviet Union. Khrushchev in his peaceful...knocked as usual his hand on the table and vetoed this suggestion...and warned the KGB and JRU to work more carefully, more securely in the future. And gave order to more rely now in the legal apparatus. This ~~is~~ is why it is so important now that more illegals, more illegal Soviet agents outside the Soviet Union than ever was before.

DULLES: May I just add a word to that. It seems to me that today along the lines with what you have said Peter, that subversion is the biggest ~~danger~~ ^{danger} that we face today. And the support of subversion, the Communist Party, the Communist Trade Unions, and the Communist fronts, all directed and financed by this apparatus that Deryarblian had pictured. And that this is the big danger we face. You take the recent OAS report on Venezuela. About how these agents were trained and sent into

Venezuela - that's not the American report, that's the report of all the Latin American countries.

COMMENTATOR: Same thing seems to be happening in Chile, doesn't it?

DULLER: There's danger in Chile, there's danger in Brazil, and we face that danger of subversion. That's what we ought to be preparing for more and more.

Then from 1958 to 1960 or 61 approximately it was some kind of period when Central Committee controlled the KGB operations when they used the members of the Communist party or the full communist parties around the world. But in 1961 Khrushchev permitted to the KGB and KGB both political and military espionage organizations to use as they can all the members of Communist Party. I mean the Communist Party around the world for espionage or subversion operations.

COMMENTATOR: And that's a change from the standard policy...

DERYARBIAN: That's a change from their policy. And there is another very interesting...

COMMENTATOR: In other words that automatically increased the number of potential espionage agents by what a thousand times? But still that's a very dangerous procedure. Because that brings the Communist Party into disrepute.

MISS M: They did that to begin with and then they cancelled it. Now tonight this is the first thing I've heard that they've gone back to it.

DERYARJIAN: They have gone back to it.

MISS M: Because in the Gouzenko case they used a Communist member of parliament who was one of the ring up in Canada for instance.

DERYARJIAN: One point I would like to make last, remember back in 1961 Khrushchev launched a friendship university, now called the ~~EX~~ Patrice Lumumba University in Soviet Union. It now is ~~about~~ about approximately 5,000 students or so. The Africans were against that they recruit students for that university and so for what the purpose the university? The real President of that university is Mr. (Yelagin) whom I knew in the way back - who was one time Soviet spy chief in Turkey and Soviet spy chief in India, and now for his good work and friendship university he was promoted to the rank of General. Then you can see what kind of training that friendship university students are getting.

COMMENTATOR: Well, that brings up too doesn't it the question of disinformation. What kind of disinformation is being distributed by the Soviets today. Can you explain this Allen?

DULLES: Well, I have here right in my hand...

COMMENTATOR: And what is disinformation, anyway.

DULLES: Well, this is it. Here's a study of a master spy. Here's a booklet that was written by me. Now it bears on the outside here -you see - a study of a master spy. I won't give you the names of the authors, but one of them is a member of the legislature of a very great friendly country. But the real author of this ... I am the master spy - I have ~~not~~ just found out recently after certain research has been done, that the real author of this pamphlet is a Colonel (Citakoff) whom I believe you know or know of. He is the real author.

DERYABIAN: (Citakoff?) I used to work with Citakoff in Vienna when he was Deputy Chief of the Soviet spy force and he was the chief of an American desk, I mean working against Americans. He was trained as intelligence officer, one time he was a spy chief in Berlin and Potsdam, another time he was in Vienna, to my knowledge last time he was in Bonn as a Consul to the Embassy, but I mentioned him in my book in articles on life on 1959 and it is my belief that he is at home now.

DULLES: ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~ He has a whole Soviet dossier on me, I've read some things there about myself that I don't even remember.

DONOVAN: Certainly a very flattering title.

DERYABIAN: He collected all this material and it is my belief that he gave all this information to the person to whom Mr. Dulles mentioned here. I mean to the good, outstanding....

MISS M: I call this the big lie, I think its easier then saying...

COMMENTATOR: I think your the big expert in this Miss M
aren't you?

MISS M: Well I used the Big Lie

COMMENTATOR: This is a big copy of Newsweek with a lot of anti-American propaganda in it which was widely distributed under a Newsweek label in Africa. It has all sorts of tremendous pictures and brutal photographs...

MISS M: I'm sorry I was just going to say that actually in the Venetian Affair the main thing I took the basis of which gave me my plot was the Big Lie - Ha Ha you've brought that along. Actually I didn't get it here Mr. Dulles - I did it from my newspaper research and after my book was published, this was drawn to my attention and of course its much fuller, if only I'd known this had existed when I was getting my novel together, the background...

DULLES: That was Mr. Helms presentation before the Congressional Committee

MISS M: Sworn testimony... before Senator Keating and its 115 pages of lies - of such - I wish everyone would send to Washington and get this book. You don't know a thing about propaganda and every newspaper man and every editor should know about this otherwise you will not be able to cope with what is actually going on in the world of journalism throughout the world.

DULLES: That is right out of the disinformation bureau of the KGB

MISS M: The lie I used by the way was the one about the CIA backing the Algerian OAS revolt in. .

COMMENTATOR: Mr. Donovan seems burning with impatience

DONOVAN: Well, this technique has, I'm sure Allen will agree with me, always been used to not only disseminate what you are calling the great lie, but actually to destroy by reputation of character - slander and otherwise - some very patriotic Americans.

MISS M: Dreadful

DULLES: Including some around this table.

DONOVAN: Well...

MISS M: You know Khrushchev has helped this now what you were telling me about him interfering again or rather going in with intelligence work which is something I hadn't realized explains why in 1963 or 57 wasn't it, November 1957, when Robert Consoidine was out interviewing him and he suddenly went off on a BIG tangent, it was a little trial balloon it turned out later because it did so well among all the British "Ban the Bombers" who picked up this little tangent which Mr. Khrushchev had said in which he said how easy it would be for the Americans to start this war because one man - which is a lie - could push a button and have the complete control of starting a war all by himself and these planes circling over the head of the SAC clearly

worried him so much that he went out of his way in this interview to attack the quality of the pilots and the chance that they might very well by human frailty start a war. Well, if he has a good intelligence service, which I believe he has, he knows very well that not one man can push a button alone and that the bomb is not arranged in that way. But that we are a nation of checks and balances and even our defense control efforts are a great deal done with the checks and balances.

Well a good deal of this at ~~MY~~ times is actually the application of the Pavlovian technique where at time the very... hears the great father who wishes only peace and next he's pounding a shoe on the table and of course it does have its psychological effect on people who especially are not imbued very strongly with high ideals.

COMMENTATOR: We have one more brief comment on this topic, I suggest Mr. Deryarblian and then we will leave this information because we must discuss the role of an intelligence organization in free society.

DERYARBELIAN: Talking about these booklets and disinformation, I'd like to say that in the KGB there is a special department for this type of work. It is known as Department D in the KGB. The Department is commanded by a wiley old Armenian named... Who is general of the KGB. He has spent much of time abroad including tour in Paris, as Assistant to (Vlengratia) the Soviet Ambassador to France who is also an intelligence officer. In fact, where is this booklet... mistaken, especially look at more booklets which appear distributed in English but in Russian by this department.

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COMMENTATOR: Let me say first, taking the offensive strongly
Allen and discussing or introducing the role of an intelligence organization
in a free society that I feel that it must be carefully, though secretly supervised.

DULLES: I agree

COMMENTATOR : It is for this reason that I have long advocated
a joint Congressional committee on intelligence to which the CIA and other
intelligence organizations would report. This as you know has been taken
up by Senator Mike Mansfield several times and other senators and the
Second Hoover Committee recommended this. The committee yet has
never come to pass. I feel it is very important. Do you disagree.

DULLES: Well, I don't necessarily disagree. We recognize that the
CIA must be under careful control . It is now under the control of the
President and the National Security Council and it reports directly to them.
It is under their control. It also has four committees in particular of the
Congress to which it reports. The two committees in the Senate and the
House are the appropriations committees for its appropriations; and there
are the two committees of the Armed Services Subcommittee in the
Senate and the House. Now if the Congress desires to have a joint committee
I don't see any great objection to that - so far they haven't wanted it. The
one thing is that some of the advocates of the committee are now coming
forth and blaming the CIA for all kinds of misdemeanors for carrying
on operations without authority as ~~justified~~ a justification for what you want.

That's what I object to. I think the Congress must decide this and the President. The Congress and the President decides it wants this - I'm sure the CIA can operate under it.

COMMENTATOR: Well, I think we'd agree don't you Mr. Donovan that secret intelligence is a potential danger in a democratic society.

DONOVAN: Well, not when its secured outside the United States. I would carefully distinguish between operations already conducted outside the United States and those that are conducted within the United States.

COMMENTATOR: Even though those operations could bring us into war as for instance the Bay of Pigs.

DONOVAN: Yes, even so.

COMMENTATOR: You don't think its a danger to a free society, I mean I tried to elicit from you what safeguards we might have.

DONOVAN: Well I think as Allen Dulles has said, the present system under which the President and the National Security Council function in this respect together even with the rather detailed checks by certain Congressional committees, I feel thus far has been satisfactory. Now until its demonstrated that there has been an abuse, I'm reluctant to expand this simply because of the possibility of political purposes to which these watchdog committees could be put. I think it could tremendously hamper the effectiveness of the Agency, now I quite agree that we cannot tolerate within a free society the existence of anything smacking of the Gestapo

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or anything of this nature, but on the other hand I think we can go so far

in worrying about a potential danger as to rather effectively destroy the ~~speed~~ speed with which the Agency can operate.

DULLES: And we can't have a free society and maintain a free society if we don't have good information about what our potential enemy may do. Look what Britain almost lost, you know very well... Now let me have a second here now. ~~Even~~ Britain might never ~~have~~ have survived if it hadn't been for Churchill who had his own intelligence service as to what was going on.

COMMENTATOR: No one decries I think this is the burden of our discussion tonight the importance of an intelligence service of the highest possible calibre. What we might differ about is how that should be controlled.

Introduction again by Baldwin of the Panel and Close of Program

TRANSMITTAL SLIP		DATE 30 March 1964
TO: Mr. John Warner, Attn: 		
ROOM NO. 7 D 01	BUILDING Headquarters	
REMARKS:		
<div style="border: 1px solid black; height: 200px; margin: 5px;"></div>		
FROM: Paul M. Chrétien Assistant to the DCI for Public Affairs		
ROOM NO. 1-F-08	BUILDING Headquarters	EXTENSION
FORM NO. 241 1 FEB 55 REPLACES FORM 36-8 WHICH MAY BE USED. GPO : 1957-O-439445 (47)		

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